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Tariff rates  on specific  products  and  the ratio  of tariff  revenue  to
import  value are  only  tenuously  related.  Above  a 50  percent  rate,
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This paper  - a product  of the  Trade Policy DiN  ision,  Policy  Research  Department  - is part of a larger
effort in the department  to assist in the design of tariff reforms.  The study was funded by the Bank's
Research Support Budget under research project "Design of Tariff Reform: Theory, Evidence,  and
Implication"(RPO  676-77).  Copiesofthe  paperare  available  free  from  the World  Bank, 1818  H  StreetNW,
Washington,  DC  20433. Please  contact  Maria  Femandez,  room S9-035,  extension  33766  (May 1993,23
pages).
The ad valorem  tariff rates on specific  products  Collection  rates appear  to level off at roughly  50
and the ratio of tariff revenue  to import  value,  percent. (In Kenya,  collected  rates are lower for
the collected  rate, are only tenuously  related,  high-tariff  than for moderate-tariff  items.
contend  Pritcheut  and Sethi.  Assigning  lower rates for high-tariff  items would
actually  increase  revenue  on those items.)
Using  tariff and revenue  data (at the  tariff
code  line level of detail)  for three developing  The implications  of these  findings  are
countries,  Pritchett  and Sethi  cnmpare  the  twofold  for calculating  general revenue:
statutory  ad valorem  tariff rates  (official  rates)
with the ratio  of tariff revenues  to import  values  * Rates are not the critical determinant  of
(collected  rates).  They document  four facts:  revenues.  The revenue  implications  of large rate
changes  can be offset by modest  changes  in the
T*  he collected  rate or any given  ^.em  of the  system  of exemptions,  for example.  T  he benefit
tariff code  has almost  no relationship  to the  of eliminating  exemptions  is primarily
official rate for that item.  transpan.ncy.  The costs  of programs  that provide
import  exemptions  for, say, regional  promotion,
* The variation  of collected  rates around  the  are often  hidden  ir customs statistics.
Official  rate increases  as the level of the official
rate increases.  '  If pressures  that cause collected  rates not to
increase  one-for-one  with tariff rates will
* The collected  rates increase  much less,  on  continue  to be present  in any tariff regime,  then
average,  than one-for-one  with the official  rates.  these  must be factored  into tariff reform  design.
* Above  a certain  level, collected  rates  do not
increase  at all despite increases  in official  rates.
The  Policy  Research  Working  PaperSeries  disseminates  the  findings  of work  under  way  in  theBank.  Anobjectiveofthe  series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The findings,  interpretations.  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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Lant Pritchet.
and
Geeta SethiTariff rates. Tariff revenue and Tariff reform: Some New Facts
Tariff reforms are one aspect of the package  of trade policy reform supported by World
Bank  adjustment  lending. Tariff reforms  aim to rationalize  the tariff code, reduce t!2e  dispersion
of rates, and lower the average tariff rate.  However, since many tariff reforms are undertaken
during periods of  stabilization  and fiscal austerity, the potential loss of  tax revenues from
lowering and unifying tariff rates has been perceived  as an important  constraint  on tariff reform
(Rajaram 1992, Mitra, 1992).
This paper uses data from three developing  countries  at the tariff code line level of detail
to examine the relationship  between  tariff revenues  and tariff rates.  We construct for each item
of the tariff code the ratio of import tax revenues  to import value, the "collected  rate" of tariffs.
Comparing  these collected rates to the official  statutory rates of the tariff code we demonstrate
four facts about the relationship  between tariff rates and tariff revenues'.
D  Collected and official tariff rates are almost completely unrelated.  In pre-reform
countries, differences  of official rates of tariff explain only a quarter of the variation in
collected rates.
*  The variance of collected  rates increases  strongly with the level of the statutory  rate.
* The collected  rate increases much less than one for one with increases  in the statutory
rate.
1  The words "official" or "statutory" rate of tariff are used interchangeably  to mean the
ad valorem rate recorded  as "the' rate for each tariff code item.  Of course, in many cases,
different rates are specified within the tariff code for the same item, with exceptions  granted
(or changes added) depending  on country of origin or end use.  For simplicity, we refer to
these as exceptions  from the "official" rate.-2-
*  Above a certain level of the official tariff rate,  further increases in the official tariff
rate produce no increase  (and there is some  evidence  of a decrease)  in the collected rate.
One way to frame the four facts is that one might suppose if all tariff revenue were
collected, that, in principle, a relationship  would  exist such that for the il item:
Collected  ratei =  ct +  o *  official rate ' + ei,
the explanatory  power of this relationship  is high, ,  =  1, and the relationship  is linear.  But
our  research shows otherwise:  the explanatory power is  low,  a  does  not equal 1,  the
relationship  is not linear, and, incidentally,  e' does not have a constant variance.
We  argue that  these facts represent general features of  pre-reform tariff codes in
developing countries, with  two immediate  implications. In refcrms of the entire system of
tariffs and tariff revenue collection, the change  in official  rates of tariff, especially  at the high
levels, is likely to be the least important element for revenue.  Changes in procedures for
assessment  of import value, granting of exemptidns,  and collections  are likely to be much  more
~important. Second,  simulations  that assume  that tariff revenues  fall one for one with rates (such
as those supported by the Bank's SINTIA software)  overstate the impact of rate reductions  on
revenues by assuming  constant  collection  rates. The impact  on revenue needs to carefully  assess
the exemption status of imports.
This paper has six sections  and a conclusion. The first section  describes  the data and the
tariff regime in Pakistan, Kenya, and Jamaica, the countries for which tariff line level data on
revenue is available. The next four sections  present the evidence for each of the four stylized
facts listed above.  The sixth section discusses  evidence from other countries suggesting  these
four features are general to pre-reform tariff systems in LDCs. The conclusion  summarizes  and3-
discusses  the implications  for the analysis  of the relationship  between  revenues  and tariff reform.
I)  Tariff regimes and data on tariffs. collections. and value
As part of ongoing  research on tariff reform we have  collected  data on tariffs at the tariff
code line level for a large number of countries (see Pritchett and Sethi, 1992).  For three of
these countries,  Pakistan, Kenya, and  Jamaica, we have  been  able to obtain  official rates of duty,
iTnport  values and import duty collected. Table I summarizes  some characteristics  of the tariff
code(s) for these three countries.  The second column gives the number of  separate items
distinguished  in the tariff nomenclature  of the countries.  These tariff codes are quite detailed
and distinguish  between 3,000 and 5,000 items 2.
Table 1:  EBasic  facts on the tariff code
Number of  Number of  Average rate of the:
tariff items  official rates  official  collected
with imports  l
Pakistan  4317  15  42  32
Kenya  3392  33  22  13
Jamaica  3303  10  16  12
Notes:  The average of the official rates is import weighted. Items with zero
import value are excluded.
The third column indicates the total number of rates of import duty for each country.
In addition  to import duty, various fees (e.g. customs  processing  fees)  and additional  taxes (e.g.
2  Tariff nomenclatures  for individual  countries are based either on the Brussels or the
new Harmonized System. Countries then further differentiate  products to the six, eight or
ten digit level.  The number of items distinguished  ill the tariff code varies across countries,
from as few as 2000 to over 12,000 (see Pritchett and Sethi, 1992).-4-
excise, sales, or luxury) may be levied and collected  on imports at the port of entry.  We focus
only on the component  of import duties as the others are either small, do not vary across items
or are not imp,_rt  taxes.  Our collection numbers correspond as closely as possible to these
import duties 3.
The last two columns  present the import value weighted  mean of the statutory tariff rate
and the average collected  rate 4. The import weighted  tariff rate gives the hypothetical  revenue,
that is the revenue from the tariff code if all import taxes were cc lected at the official rate.  As
with other countries, actual revenues are far below this hypothetical  as the average official rate
is almost twice as high as the average collection  rate.  The difference  between hypothetical  and
actual revenue is due to exemptions 5. Since both revenues and import values are taken directly
from customs statistics, tariff losses from smuggling, the underdeclaration  of import values
(underinvoic.ig) and the misdeclaration  of items are omitted.  To the extent that these are
important, we understate  the gap between actual revenues and those that would be collected if
all imports were paid on the official tariff.  The differences we examine are entirely due to
recorded exemptions  from the tariff code.
The three countries were at various stages of their trade reforms in the tariff codes we
use.  Jamaica had already had several rounds of tariff reform, with reductions in the average
rate.  Kenya's trade reform has mainly focused  on import licensing to date, including some
3  For Jamaica, import revenue is from Common  External Tariff (CET).  For both Kenya
and Pakistan, the revenues are based on collection from just customs  duty.
I  Tariff code items with zero import value were excluded from the all calculations  are
the collected rate could no be constructed.
5  At this stage we'll just define exemptions  this way.  What these exemptions  constitute
will be discussed  below.-5
tariffication  that has raised the unweighted  average. Paldstan's tariff code has already undergone
substantial  rationalization  as part of their adjustment  efforts.
II Collected rates and statutory  rates: not even cousin
Official rates have almost no influence  on tariff code items at collected  rates across tariff
line items.  For a few selected levels of the official tariff rate, Table 2 presents the number of
items at this tariff rate, the mean collected rate of items at this rate, the &tandard  deviation  and
coefficient  of variation and the 25th and 75th percentile. These results heuristically  preview a
number of the results to be presented statistically  later in the paper,  the interesting  feature in
the present context is tie  huge variation of collected  rates for items with the same official  rate.
For example, in Paldstan the mean collected rate for the 899 items with a tariff rate of 80% is
51%, but the standard deviation is 31.  One quarter of the 80% rate items paid duty less than
21% while one quarter paid a duty abo e 78%.  For the 495 items with a  100% tariff, one
quarter paid less than 7% while one quarter paid more than 94%.  Similarly  for Kenya, among
the 429 items with a tariff rate of 50% the mean collected  rate is only 26%, one quarter paid
less than 6%, one quarter paid more than 26%, and the standard deviation  is 27.-6-
Table 2:  Summary  Statistics of Collected  Rates
By Level of Official Rate
Official  Number of  Mean  Standard  25  75  1h
rate  items  Collected  Deviation  percentile  percentile
.______  ________  _  (C.V.)  _  _._  .
Pakistan
20  547  15  14(92)  5  20
40  789  32  18 (56)  i.46  40
60  267  40  21 (53)  23  58
80  899  51  31 (61)  21  78
100  495  52  40 (76)  7  94
125  !  605  54  47 (88)  3  95
Kenya
20  331  5  10 (194)  0  3
30  950  9  14 (156)  0  22
40  435  20  20 (101)  0  24
50  429  26  27 (106)  6  26
60  206  43  39 (92)  26  56
80  306  31  30 (95)  26  31
100  108  36  37 (102)  4  34
Jamaica
10  1375  7  7(91)  3.18  10
30  517  16  12 (76)  5  26
45  1  662  24  17 (72)  7  44
The fact that the variation of collected rates even for the same official rate is so large
suggests that there is very little systematic relationship  between the statutory tariff levels and
actual collection rates.  Table 3 illustrates that statement  statistically. An analysis of variance-7-
(ANOVA)  decomposed  the variation of the collected  rates of individual  items about the overall
mean into a component associated with variations in official rates and the fraction of the
variation of collected rates that actually occurs for items with the same official rate 6. For
Pakistan only 23% of the collected rate variance is explained  by official rates; for Kenya this
is only 27  % and for Jamaica, after several rounds of tariff reform, the number is up to 31  %.
Typically less than one quarter of the variation of the tariff revenues collected across products
is related to variations in the official rates.  This low explanatory  power is especially  surprising
giveni  the enormous variation in the official rates..
Table 3: Explanatory  power of official  rate for collected rate
[Functional  Pakistan  Kenya  Jamaica
Form:  _
ANOVIA  .23  .27  .31
Regression  R-squared
Linear  .16  .21  .29
Log-Log  .18  .24  .30
Linear, with  .22  .22  .29
spline  I  _
Quadratic  .20  .21  .29
Notes:  Functional  forms of regressions  of collected rate (CR) on the official rate
(OR) are: Linear, CR-=  a  + g *OR; Log-Log, ln(CR)  a  + j *ln(OR); Linear
with spline, CR= a  + a  *OR+  j  *(OR-t), where t  is the level of official tariff
at which the slope changes; Quadratic, CR= c, + 0 *OR +  a  l*OR 2.
6  Since the official rate is a discrete variable (the number of different levels is given in
table 1) it can be treated as a "treatment"  variable in a traditional  analysis of variance.An alternative procedure is to assume some relationship  between the collected rate and
the official rate of the forn:
Collected  rate =  f (official rate).
If the collected rate were primarily a function  of the tariff rate, one would expect a relationship
of this type to have high explanatory  power. The second  tc, fifth lines of Table 3 report the R-
squared of a regression of collected rates on statutory  ratus for a variety of functional  forms for
each country. The number is very low 7, confirming  the results of the analysis of variance. For
Kenya and Pakistan the R2 is undiformly  below  25% while forJamaica it is roughly 30%.  A low
R-squared  across the various forms reveals that little of the variation  in collections  is related to
variations in official rates.
III)  Increasing variation of the collected rate
The second fact is that the variation of the collected  rate of items with the same official
rate increases with the level of the official rate.  In Table 2 we can see that for each country
the standard deviation increases substantially. For instance, in Kenya, when the tariff is 20%
the standard deviation is 10, increasing to 20 at 40% and 39 at 60%.  Of course, since the
standard deviation is not scale invariant this is not altogether surprising.  The coefficient  of
variation (in parenthesis  in column 4 of Table 2) divides the standard  deviation by ihe mean to
achieve  a scale invariant number. The coefficient  of variation indicates  that not only do higher
statutory rates have higher absolute deviations, but, except for the lowest rates,  they are
generally larger as a fraction of the mean value as well.
I  Since the regression formulations  impose  additional  structural restrictions on the
relationship, the R 2 will be lower than the ANOVA.-9-
Table 4 reports statistical tests of increasing  variance in several forms.  Ir. the first row
are the results of an ANOVA with the levels of the official rate as the treatment variable and
the variance of collection rates as the dependent  variable (as opposed to the level in Table 3).
We find that the level of the official  tariff is at least as successful  in explaining  the variation of
collected rates around the official rate as it was in explaining  actual collections,  as the ANOVA
"fraction explained" of .41,  .13 and .42 are substantially  higher than those in Table 3 for
Paldstan and Jamaica.  We can predict with more confidence that increasing the tariff will
increase the variance that it will raise mean collections.  In the following  rows, the absolute
value (or squares) of the residuals of the collection rate regressed on the statutory level of the
tariff are themselves  regressed  on the level of the statutory  rate 8. The explanatory  power of the
log-log specification  shows that the percentage  variation of the residual increases  along wiJh  the
absolute level.
Table 4:  v  ane of Collecl  i  Rates and the Level of Official  Tariff
Pakistan  Kenya  Jamaica
ANOVA  0.41  0.13  0.42
Regression  form R2:
e I (linear)  0.38  0.08  0.41
e'I  (log)  0.41  0.10  0.42
(eI)A2/sA2  0.21  0.04  0.24
Notes:  Row 2 regresses the absolute values of the residuals of the linear
regression on the official  rate.  Row 3 regresses the absolute  values of the
log-log regression  on the log official  rate.  Row 4 regresses the normalized
squared residuals of the linear regression  on the official rate.
8  This is essentially  a test of heteroskedasticity  of the error term, which in thus  case is
not so interesting in its own right.- 10-
L)YLHigher  rates. not higher:revenues
There are a number  of good reasons to believe  that tariff revenues will not increase one
for one with increases in tariff rates.  To the extent that the good itself has some elasticity with
respect to the tariff rate the value of the import in a category will decrease  with an increase in
the ta.-ff rate (ceteris paribus, of course).  A second revenue elasticity is relevant  as the value
of imports reported for tariff purposes will decline, even for a given level of actual imports,
because  underinvoicing  and smuggling  as the tariff rises.
This study documents  a third channel.  Even for a given value of imports declared to
customs, the ratio of imports  coming in with exemption  will increase  as the tariff rate increases.
This will happen for at least three reasons.  First, even under a fixed set of exemptions (say a
scheme that provides exemptions to exporters), as the tariff is raised, the value of imports
coming in  under non-exemptions  will decrease (with the magnitude  depending on the price
elasticity of the non-exempt  goods) while the value coming in under exemption will remain
constant, and this will increase  the fraction  under ex2mption. Second,  the incentive  to lobby for
exemptions  will increase  with the level of tariffs. Exemptions  either for specific  types of goods,
for specific  importers, or just plain discretionary  are endemic in tariff systems.  In a situation
in which the lobbying for exemptions  and the degree of exemptions  granted is endogenous, an
increase in  the  rate will increase the  fraction of  imports coming in  under exemption as
exemptions increase.  Finally the temptations for abuse of any system of exemptions will
increase with the level of  the tariff.  For  instance, exemptions are  commonly granted to
exporters, or diplomatic  missions  and charitable  activities, or to returning  residents. The higher- 11  -
the tariff, the larger the incentive for false diversion  of imports under any scheme into other
channels.
This  third channel for low revenue elasticity to  tariff changes is  potentially quite
important, as seen in Table 2.  For Pakistan, the mean of the collected  rate for items with a 60
percent tariff is 40 percent.  For items with an 80 percent tariff, the mean of the collected rate
increases only to 51 percent and then is roughly the same (52 and 54 percent) for items with
official rates of 100 and 125  percent.  In Kenya, the mean of the collection  rate decreases from
43 percent at 60 percent official to 31 percent at 80 percent and 36 percent at 100 percent.
If the official rate were collected on all imports, the collections for the ith tariff item
would be:
Collected  ratei  =  a  +  *  (official rate')  +  ei,
with  a  =  0 and 0  = 1.  We start with this simple  model  in the first line of Table 6.  For each
country, the slope (the response of collected rate to a  change in the official rate) is  both
substantively  and statistically  much less than one 9. An increase  of ten percentage points of the
official rates produces an increase of only  3.3 percentage points in the collected rate for
Pakistan, 4.9 for Kenya and 4.7 for Jamaica.  While this may seem obvious and important,
many simulations  of revenue loss from tariff reforms  have relied  essentially  on the simple model
above with c  =  0,  ,  =  1.
The subsequent  rows of Table 6 verify that this result is robust  to econometric  variations.
9  Given the small standard errors of the coefficient  estimates, the t-tests reject the null
hypothesis  that ,  =  1 at any reasonable significance  level.- 12 -
Since at the 5,000 item level many import categories are quite small in value terms" 0,  we
weight the regression by import value to be sure the small coefficient  estimates are not being
driven by the odd behavior in the data for the smaller import categories.  The weighted OLS
results in row 2 show coefficients  that are in every case lower than the unweighted  results. In
row 3 we report another weighted  regression, this time with the statutory rate as the weighte 1.
The coefficients  are nearly the same, except for Pakistan, which is much lower.
Table 6:  Regression  of Collected  Rate on the Official  Rat
Country:  Pakistan  Kenya  Jamaica
Functional  form of  Coeff.  R2  Coeff.  R 2 Coeff.  R
regression:  (Std.  (Std.  (Std.
.!  ____________  Err)  Err)  Err)
Linear  0.33  0.16  0.49  0.21  0.47  0.30
(.01)  (.01)  (.01)  ___
Weighted  by import  0.29  0.14  0.10  0.01  0.28  0.16
values  (.01)  (.02)  (.01)  l
Weighted  by official rate  0.12  0.02  0.47  0.02  0.50  0.20
(.02)  (.01)  (.02)
Linear, excluding  0.38  0.20  0.31  0.12  0.50  0.31
observations  where  (.01)  (.01)  (.01)
CR=0
1  As noted above, a number of the import categories have zero vs'ue.  The division of
the tariff code leads to code items of intrinsically  very different sizes.  The ratio of the value
of imports in the item of the 75d pe.centile to those in the 25'  percentile is 27 (Jamaica),  75
(Pakistan)  and over 1,000 (Kenya).
11 After all, line 2 of table 4 is a Bruesch-Pagan  test for heteroskedasticity  iinear in the
statutory rate.  The problem of inconsistent  standard error estimates  is less serious.  The
White heteroskedasticity  consistent standard estimates  produce all the same results, because
-the standard errors are so small relative to the coefficients  in any case.- 13 -
The fourth row excludes those items for which the collection rate is zero even though
recorded import values are positive. These may be tariff items that have a positive official  rate
reported but have been uniformly  excluded  from tariff collections  for some  reason. These items
would perhaps be more accurately counted as items with a zero rate and this might create a
downward bias.  This procedure of excluding all items with a zero rate will, however, also
exclude items for which a tariff actually was in force but all imports received an individual
exemption.  This will produce an upward bias in the slope.  The fourth row shows that the
coefficients  are increased slightly, but not dramatically, for Palistan and Jamaica  and are lower
for Kenya.
The regressions  in log-log form produce no better overall fit and in percentage form the
conclusions  are roughly the same.
O) Might rates be over the Laffer Curve?
A reduction in tariff levels could actually  increase revenue if increases in the tariff rate
above a certain level reduce the collection rate 12. This is one way of producing a  'Laffer
Effect."3 Our results provide some evidence that substantial parts of  the  tariff code for
Pakistan are on the declining  revenue portion  of the Laffer curve: in general, collection  rates fall
12  This is a sufficient,  but by no means necessary, condition. Since tariff revenue (CM)
is equal to the ad valorem collected rate times the import value (MV), TR=CR*MV then the
total differential  is dTR/dt =  CR*dMV/dt + MV*dCR/dt. Usual analysis focuses on the
dMV/dt term, which depends on the elasticity  of tariff value w.r.t tariff changes.
13  The Laffer curve shows the relationship  of tax revenues to the tax rate. For example,
for an income tax by assumption  zero revenue is collected at 0 percent tax rate and,
plausibly, zero revenue is collected at 100  percent rate, which implies that tariff revenues are
at a maximum  for some rate between zero and hundred  percent taxation.- 14 -
as the official rate rises.  The first column for each country in Table 7 allows the introduction
of a spline' 4, which allows the slope  of the relationship  to be different above and below a given
level of the tariff.  Algebraically  if t  is the turning point:
CRk =  af + #*(ORi)  +  , l*(ORi - t)  +  ei,
where CR is the collected  rate and OR is the official  rate.  The slope  of the relationship  between
collected rates and official rates below the rate t' is  0,  while above the rate t' the slope is 
+  j3 1.  For all three countries we find strong evidence that the slope falls as the official rate
rise.  For Palistan below a tariff rate of 80% the estimated slope is .6 while above that point
the slope is actually negative, -.02'5.  In Jamaica the slope falls from .43 to .11 above 40%.
For Kenya below the kink point tariff of 60 the slope  is .58 while above the slope is only .25.
14  A spline regression allows the regression  to have a different slope above and below a
certain point.  The function is continuous but without continuous  first derivatives as the slope
jumps at the ldnk point.
15 As shown by the standard error, in each of the cases the differences  of slope are
statistically  significant, but the smaller slope may or may not be statistically  different from
zero.- 15  -
Table 7:  Non-linear Terms in the Collected  Rate - Official  Rate Regression
Pakistan  Kenya  Jamaica
Spline  Quadratic  Spline  Quadratic  Spline  Quadratic
Official  .60  .60  .58  .51  .43  .39
rate  (.02)  (.02)  (.025)  (.05)  (.02)  (.06)
OR above  -.02  .25  .11
t*  (.03)  _  (.04)  (.05)
Quadratic  -.0015  -.00028  .000
term  (.0001)  (.00043)  (.000)




R'  .22  .20  .21  .21  .29  .29
The second column for each country  shows  the result of the quadratic  regressions, which
allow the slope to change over time.  Again there is some evidence  of non-linearity 16. The rate
at which the collection rate rises as the tariff rate increases falls, and ultimately becomes
negative for Pakistan and Kenya 17. The estimated  turning point for Pakistan is 220.
The data for Kenya are unusual. In Table 2 we see that the collected rate actually falls
from 43 percent for items with an official  rate of 60 percent to 31 for 80 percent items and 36
for 100 percent items.  This would suggest a sharp downward  slope.  However, there are also
22 (of 3,400) items with a tariff of 135 percent for which the collection rate is 117 percent.
These observations  weaken the statistical  findings  of non-linearity.
16  Another indication  of non-linearity  is that the Durbin-Watson  statistic is quite low,
when the data are ordered prior to estimation  by the official rate.
17  If the model is CR =  a  +  fl  *OR +  j3  l*ORA2,  then the slope is dCR/DOR =
+ 2,3 1*OR. The turning point of the regression  is -, /2,  (1.- 16 -
The data suggest  that the relationship  is non-linear,  such  that the increase  in the collection
rate for a 10 percentage point increase in official rates is much smaller for higher rates than
lower rates.  We did not find strong evidence of Laffer effects in collected rates alone (a very
weakly sufficient condition)  but non-linearity  adds an additional  channel for Laffer effects to
appear.  In  any case, this non-linearity of collected rates and official rates has important
implications for the revenue consequences  of "concertina" type tariff reforms that push rates
down from the top (and up from the bottom).
VI)  Are these countries secial?
The three countries for which analysis is presented  are simply those for which we were
able to acquire data on tariffs, import values and revenue at the detailed  level necessary.  We
suspect that these countries are typical and that the wide divergence  between individual items'
official rates and the collection of revenue is a common feature of pre-reform tariffs.  We
present two pieces of  evidence for this view:  comparisons of aggregate revenues versus
hypothetical  revenue across countries, and studies of exemptions  in a number of countries.
The import  weighted  average  tariff rate gives the ratio of hypothetical  revenue to imports,
that is the ratio of total tariff revenue to import values that would  result if import duty were fully
collected at the single official rate on all imports.  It has been widely noted that the import
weighted average and the aggregate  ratio of revenue to collections  diverge widely.  In earlier
work, we (Pritchett  and Sethi, 1992)  find that for the eight countries  for which we can calculate- 17 -
both the  trade weighted average and the ratio of import duty to  imports' 8,  the excess of
hypothetical revenue over actual varies from quite small (55% vs 51 % for India) to immense
(32% vs 7% for Brazil). Nogues  and Gulati  (1992)  give the ratio of the weighted  average tariff
rate to collection ratios in three Latin American  countries (in a pre-reform year) as Argentina
(1988) 39 percent vs. 17 percent, Costa Rica (1988) 16 percent vs. 7 percent, Peru (1989) 45
percent vs. 16 percent 19.
Kostecld and Tymowski  (198 ) review import weighted  average tariff and the collected
rate (they call the 'ad valorem  incidence")  and find substantial  divergence  between  the two, with
coliected rates generally half or less the trade weighted average.  The magnitude was quite
different across countries: in 1977, the trade weighted  average ir  Venezuela was around 27
percent while collections  were 4.7 percent whereas  the trade weighted  average  in Colombia  was
around 22 percent, but collections  were 12.3 percent. Erzan, et al, (1989), in a review of the
structure  of protection  for a large number  of LDCs as of 1985, give the average  import-weighted
level of tariffs 20 at 30 percent, ranging from 66 percent in Central America to 5 percent in
West Asia.  A comparison  with figures from the IMF's Government  Finance Statistics 2' for
18 In this case the import duty information  is coming from the IMF's GFS, as we don't
have actual collections  data.
l9 This combines  information  from Nogues and Gulati in table 3.10 and tables 1.1, 1.3
and 1.5.
20  This includes what they refer to as "para-tariffs,"  non-import  duty charges levied on
imports such as; customs  charges, stamp taxes, taxes on foreign exchange transactions,  etc.,
but excluding sales or excise taxes.
21  This compares the ratio of GFS line 6.1 Revenue  from Import Duties to IMF IFS line
71, Imports CIF in local currency.- 18 -
similar years finds average  collection  rates generally  between 10 percent and 20 percent (except
for a few high collection countries  like India).
Direct evidence on the amount of tariff revenue lost to exemptions  is difficult to come
by.  Exemptions, including preferential lower tariff rates which are partial exemptions, are
granted for a wide variety of reasons: country of origin (e.g. customs  unions, or the GSP), end-
use (e.g. imports for exports), type of importer (e.g. charities, parastatals), type of financing
(e.g. donor financed  imports, foreign investment),  or simply  discretionary  exemptions  granted
for worthy causes.  Data show that in 1988, Brazilian parastatals  paid almost no tariffs (.5%
of import value)  while private firms pay a substantial  tariff (13.4%), although  this is still  a small
fraction of the import weighted tariff (39.8%).  Foroutan (1990) examines  import exemptions
in Argentina  and finds a large amount of revenue lost to exemptions  of various types.  A study
in 1988 in Tanzania found that one third of all exemptions  were made under the discretionary
authority granted to the Minister of Finance.
We have data from Cote d'lvoire on the tariff rate, import values and the value of
imports fully exempt from tariffs, although no information  on revenues.  The proportion of
import value exempt  increases  significantly  with the level of the official  tariff (see Table 8).  For
India we have data on import tariff levels and collected rates, but only aggregated to the two
digit level.  Here again we firA that the collected  rate increases  at a much less than one for one
level with increases in the official tariff as well'.
22 There must be some bias as a result of aggregation,  but we haven't figured out which
way it goes.- 19  -
Table 8:  Regressions  for Countries without  Detailed Revenue  Data on the Official Rate
[Country:  Cote D'Ivoire  India  l
Dependent Variable  Percent of fully exempt  Average ratio of collections
imports in total import value  to imports at two digit
Official Rate  .26  .24
(standard  error)  (.042)  |  (.08)
R_2  .016  .09
Number observations  2507  92
The available evidence suggests that exemptions  are a prominent  feature of pre-reform
tariff systems in many, if not most, countries.
Implications  and Conclusions
As usual, correctly interpreting the implications  of our four facts is more difficult than
documenting the facts themselves.  These results have implications in  two areas of tariff
analysis, revenue and protection.
The distinction  between changes in tariff rates ceteris paribus (that is, holding all other
aspects  of the tariff regime constant)  and a change in tariff rates  simultaneous  with other changes
(e.g. changes in procedures for receiving  exemptions)  is important. An easy conclusion is that
a calculation  of the revenue implications  of tariff rate change  that calculates  hypothetical  revenue
under the existing tariff and hypothetical  revenue under the new tariff rates is probably worse
than useless3.  If the change in rates is in fact ceteris paribus then this calculation will vastly
2  This kind of calculation was quite common  and the SINTIA software  distributed by
the Bank facilitates  this calculation, although  more correct calculations  are possible by
downgrading  imports by exemption status.- 20 -
overstate the revenue lost.  For  instance, in Table 2 we see that for Pakistan the revenue
foregone from a concertina reform that lowered  al! -ates down to 80 would in fact be minimal
as the collection rates essentially level off at 50% anyway.  The "hypothetical  revenue lost"
under the standard assumption  would be the total import value of those items above 80% times
the difference between the previous tariff and 80%, which is a substantial  number.  In Kenya,
given that collected rates are lower for high tariff than moderate  tariff items, moving  those  items
to lower rates would actually increase revenue 24 rather than the massive loss a "hypothetical
revenue" calculation  would suggest.
Of course tariff reform generally  includes  broader treatment  of the tariff regime than  just
a change in tariff rates.  If that is so, the relationship  between collection  rates and official rates
might change if, for example, exemptions  were curtailed.  The implications  of our results !or
more general revenue calculations  are twofold.  First, rates are not the critical determinant  of
revenues.  The revenue implications  of large changes  in rates can be offset by modest  changes
elsewhere in the system  of exemptions,  and areas such as smuggling  or underinvoicing  and false
customs declarations have not even been discussed. Second, the pressures that lead collected
rates not to increase  one-for-one  with tariff rates will continue  to be present in any tariff regime.
Many exemptions  are actually "tax  expenditures"  and a collection  of the tax and allocated
expenditures  elsewhere  would be a wash  in the budget. For instance, an exemption  from import
duties for exporters will be roughly  equivalent  to a duty drawback  that collects  the revenue and
then pays it out again to exporters.  A tariff exemption to government agencies essentially
24  If those new items then had the same collection  performance  as other items at the
same rate.  This may not be true if a high rate and exemptions  were acting as a discretionary
quota (see the discussion below on the protection  implications).- 21 -
allocates income to them from the foregone import duties and a collection of the duty with
offsetting  increases in their budget would  produce the same effect.  In these cases the benefit  of
eliminating exemptions  is primarily transparency,  as the costs of programs that provide import
exemptions for say, regional promotion, are often hidden in the customs statistics.
The last area is the implication  of the wide divergence  between  collected  rates and official
rates  for analysis  of protection  provided by the tariff. An initial inclination  is to use the average
ratio of collections to import value as the "effective" tariff for an item.  Howvever  whether or
not this is correct depends  on why revenues  are less than the official  tariff. Three examples  will
hopefully clarify the point.
A) Say the tariff is 50 percent but parastatals are exempt and are responsible for 50
percent of the imports.  The ratio of import duty to import value would be 25 percent
but the marginal price an importer would have to pay (if the parastatals  are forbidden  to
resell) would be the full tariff of 50 percent and the fact that any imports came in at 50
percent at all would indicate that the difference between the domestic price and the
border price is at least 50 percent.  This is just another way of saying the obvious: that
it is the marginal, not the average, price that matters for incentive calculations.
B)  Say the tariff rate is 50 percent but a preferential  arrangement  stipulates  that imports
from country X receive a rate of 25 percent.  If country X can fully satisfy the demand
for the item then the marginal and average tariff is the 25 percent preferential rate and
using the ratio of import duty to value would be correct.
C)  Say the tariff was 50 percent but a complete  exemption  was granted to some group
(say charitable organizations)  but that resale was not effectivelv  prohibited.  Then the- 22 -
marginal  and  average  rate would  be 0. However,  if some  group  (say  foreign  firms)  were
forbidden  to take  advantage  of the secondary  market  for exempt  imports  and forced  to
pay the full rate and this disadvantaged  group  accounted  for 20 percent  of the import
value,  then the official  rate would  be 50 percent,  the average  collected  rate would  be 10
percent  while  the marginal  rate would  be 0.
This  adds  another  reason  (to  an already  long  list)  why  analysis  of nominal  tariff  rates  is unlikely
to provide  much  information  on protection.- 23 -
Bibliography
Rajaram, Anand, 1991, "Tariff and Tax Reform: Do World Bank  Recommendations  Adequately
Integrate Revenue and Protection Objectives," mimeo.
Erzan, Refik, Hiroaki Kuwahara, Serafinao  Marchese  and Rene Vossenaar, 1989, "The Profile
of Protection in Developing  Countries," UNCTAD Rpvigg, vol 1, #1, pp 29-49.
Foroutan, Faezeh, 1990, "The Distortionary  Effect of Exemptions  in Argentina," World Bank
PRE Working Paper #388.
Kostecki, M. M. and M. J. Tymowski, 1985, "Customs  Duties versus Other Import Charges
in the Developing  Countries," Joumaal  of World Trade Law, Vol. 19 #13, pp. 269-286.
Mitra, Pradeep, 1992, "The Coordinated  Reform of Tariffs and Indirect Taxes,"  World Bank
Research Observer,  vol 7 (2), pp. 195-218.
Nogues, Julio and Sunil Gulati, "Economic  Polic. ts and Performance  under Alternative  Trade
Regimes:  Latin America during the 1980s,"  LAC Technical department. Regional
Studies Program, #16.
Pritchett, Lant and Geeta Sethi, 1992, "The Structure  and Reform of Tariffs,"  mimeo.Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
Contact
Ttls  Au.hor  Date  for paper
WPS1115  Looking  at  the  Facts:  What  We  Know Ross  Levine  March  1993  D. Evans
about  Policy  and  Growth  from  Cross- Sara  Zervos  38526
Country  Analysis
WPSI  116 Implications  of  Agricultural  Trade  Antonio  Salazar  Brandao  March  1993  D. Gustafson
Liberalization  for  the  Developing  Will  Martin  33714
Countries
WPS1  117  Portfolio  Investment  Flows  to  Sudarshan  Gooptu  March  1993  R. Vo
Emerging  Markets  31047
WPS1  118  Trends  in Retirement  Systems  and  Olivia  S.  Mitchell  March  1993  ESP
Lessons  for Reform  33680
WPS1119  The  North  American  Free  Trade  Raed  Safadi  March  1993  J. Jacobson
Agreement:  Its Effect  on South  Asia  Alexander  Yeats  33710
WPS1  120  Policies  for Coping  with  Price  Donald  F. Larson  March  1993  D. Gustafson
Uncertainty  for Mexican  Maize  33714
WPS1  121 Measuring  Capital  Flight:  A Case  Harald  Eggerstedt  March  1993  H.  Abbey
Study  of Mexico  Rebecca  Brideau  Hall  80512
Sweder  van  Wijnbergen
WPS1  122 Fiscal  Decentralization  in  Transitional  Richard  Bird  March  1993  B.  Pacheco
Economies:  Toward  a Systemic  Christine  Wallich  37033
Analysis
WPS1  123  Social  Development  is Economic  Nancy  Birdsall  April  1993  S. Rothschild
Development  37460
WPS1  124  A New  Database  on  Human  Capital  Vikram  Nehru  April  1993  M.  Coleridge-
Stock:  Sources,  Methodology,  and  Eric  Swanson  Taylor
Results  Ashutosh  Dubey  33704
WPS1  125 Industrial  Development  and  the  Adriaan  Ten  Kate  April  1993  C.  Jones
Environment  in Mexico  37699
WPSI  126  The  Costs  and  Benefits  of Slovenian  Milan  Cvikl  April  1993  S. Moussa
Independence  Evan  Kraft  39019
Milan  Vodopivec
WPS1  127  How  International  Economic  I inks  Vikram  Nehru  April  1993  M.  Coleridge-
Affect  East  Asia  Taylor
33704
WPS1128  The  International  Ocean  Transport  Hans  JOrgen  Peters  April  1993  J. Lucas-
Industry  in Crisis:  Assessing  the  Walker
Reasons  and  Outlook  31078Pollcy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1  129 How Pollcy  Changes  Affected  Cocoa  Jonathan  R. Coleman  April 1993  G. llogon
Sectors  in Sub-Saharan  African  Takamasa  Akiyama  33732
Countries  Panos  N. Varangis
WPSI 130 Poverty  and Policy  Michael  Lipton  April 1993  P. Cook
Martin  Ravallion  33902
WPS1  131 Prices  and Protocols  in Public  Jeffrey  S. Hammer  April 1993  J. S. Yang
Health  Care  81418
WPS1  132 An Analysis  of Repressed  Inflation  Andrew  Feltenstein  April 1993  E.  Zamora
in Three  Transitional  Economies  Jiming  Ha  33706
WPS1  133 Macroeconomic  Framework  for an  Ibrahim  Elbadawi  April 1993  A. Maranon
Oil-Based  Economy:  The  Case  of  Nader  Majd  31450
Bahrain
WPS1  134 Managing  a Nonrenewable  Resource: Ibrahim  A. Elbadawi  April 1993  A. Maranon
Savings  and Exchange-Rate  Policies Nader  Maid  31450
in Bahrain
WPS1  135 Inflation  in Czechoslovakia,  1985-91  Zdenek  Drabek  May 1993  E.  Zamora
Kamil  Janacek  33706
Zdenek  Tuma
WPS1  136 The Dynamic  Behavior  of Quota  Kala Krishna  May 1993  D. Gustafson
License  Prices:  Theory  and Evidence Ling  Hui  Tan  33714
from  the Hong  Kong  Apparel  Quotas
WPS1  137 Railway  Reform  in  the oentral  and  Philip  W. Blackshaw  May 1993  TW1UTD
Eastern  European  Economies  Louis  S.  Thompson  31005
WPS1  138 The Economic  Impact  of Military  Daniel  Landau  May  1993  C. Jones
Expenditures  37699
WPS1  139 Should  Sub-Saharan  Africa  Expand  Jonathan  R. Coleman  May 1993  G. liogon
Conon  Exports?  M. Elton  Thigpen  33732
WPS1  140 How  Retail  Food  Markets  Responded Bruce  Gardner  May 1993  C. Spooner
to Price  Liberalization  in Russia  Karen  M. Brooks  32116
after January  1992
WPS1  141 Foreign  Direct  Investment  in a  Maxwell  J. Fry  May 1993  R. Vo
Macroeconomic  Framework:  Finance,  31047
Efficiency,  Incentives,  and Distortions
WPS1  142 Rent-Seeking  Trade  Policy:  A Time-  Martin  Rama  May 1993  D. Ballantyne
Series  Approach  37947
WPS1  143 Tariff  Rates,  Tariff  Revenue,  and  Lant Pritchett  May 1993  M. Fernandez
Tariff  Reform:  Some  New  Facts  Geeta  Sethi  33766